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Large numbers of new products introduced annually by manufacturers may strain the relationship betweenretailers and manufacturers regarding assortments carried by retailers. For example, many retailers in the
grocery industry will agree to broaden their assortments only if the manufacturer agrees to pay slotting fees for
the new products. We investigate the role played by slotting fees in coordinating the assortment decisions in a
supply chain. To do so, we study a single-retailer, single-manufacturer supply chain, where the retailer decides
what assortment to offer to end customers. Double marginalization results in a discrepancy between the re-
tailer’s optimal assortment and the assortment that maximizes total supply chain profits. We consider a payment
scheme that is analogous to slotting fees used in the grocery industry: the manufacturer pays the retailer a
per-product fee for every product offered by the retailer in excess of a certain target level. We show that, if the
wholesale price is below some threshold level, this payment scheme induces the retailer to offer the supply-
chain-optimal assortment and makes both parties better off.
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1. Introduction
Consumer goods manufacturers introduced more
than 31,000 items in 2000, and the typical grocer
stocked about 40,000 items in 2001, double the num-
ber of a few years earlier (Nelson 2001). A byproduct
of this growth in product variety is the increased
number of choices available to consumers. For exam-
ple, in 2001, a consumer could choose from 16
different flavors of Kellogg’s Eggo waffles and from
nine different kinds of Kleenex tissue (Nelson 2001).
Such broad assortments put a strain on the relation-
ship between retailers and manufacturers when it
comes to the level of variety offered by retailers. For
example, many retailers in the grocery industry have
been asking manufacturers to pay slotting fees in
order to carry new products. According to a Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) report, retailers report
receiving slotting fees on 60% of new items, whereas
manufacturers report paying slotting fees on 80–90%
of new items. The same FTC report says that the
average slotting fee can range from $65 per store for
bread to $92 per store for hot dogs (Klie 2004). The
topic of slotting fees is a rather controversial one
among the players in the grocery industry, spurring
multiple FTC reports and Senate committee hearings.
In fact, the topic creates such tension in the retailer–
manufacturer relationship that when the Senate Small
Business Committee held hearings on the matter in
1999, out of 200 manufacturers interviewed, only
three testified, and two did so hidden behind a screen
so as to remain anonymous (Schoenberger 2000).
In this paper, we investigate the role played by
slotting fees in coordinating the assortment decisions
in a supply chain. We consider a single-retailer, single-
manufacturer supply chain, where the retailer is in
charge of deciding what assortment to offer to end
customers. We explicitly model consumer choice and
the effect of product variety on the inventory costs
borne by the retailer. In a decentralized supply chain
where the retailer and the manufacturer are indepen-
dent, double marginalization results in a discrepancy
between the assortment of products the retailer
chooses to offer (hereafter, the retailer–optimal assort-
ment) and the assortment that maximizes total supply
chain profits (hereafter, the supply-chain-optimal
assortment). In this setting, we address two main
questions: Can slotting fees induce the retailer to offer
the supply-chain-optimal assortment? Is it ever in the
best interest of the manufacturer to pay slotting fees?
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In our model, customers choose from the set
of products offered by the retailer. In modeling the
demand and consumer choice, we use the multi-
nomial logit (MNL) model as used by van Ryzin and
Mahajan (1999), who examine the inventory manage-
ment and assortment planning problem faced by a
retailer. On the inventory control side, in the decen-
tralized supply chain of our model, the retailer faces
an infinite-horizon, periodic-review inventory control
problem for each of the products in the assortment.
The retailer places an order with the manufacturer for
each product at the beginning of each period. The
manufacturer builds to order. In order to maintain
tractability, we assume that the cost and price param-
eters are the same for all products. This assumption
holds in cases where the items differ from each other
only in attributes such as color, scent, or flavor.
We consider a contract under which the manufac-
turer pays a fee to the retailer for every product the
retailer carries in its assortment in excess of a certain
target level. The target level is set to be the number of
products in the assortment the retailer is offering in
the status quo. This contract is of particular interest,
since it strongly resembles the slotting fees used in the
grocery industry: the manufacturer pays the retailer a
fee for every additional product the retailer adds to its
assortment, as required by slotting fees. We show that
if the wholesale price in the supply chain is below a
threshold level, this contract will induce the retailer to
offer the supply-chain-optimal assortment. In addi-
tion, this contract guarantees that both the retailer and
the manufacturer will be better off, provided that the
wholesale price is below the threshold level. Interest-
ingly, once the wholesale price exceeds the threshold
level, it will not be possible to find a fee that will
induce the retailer to choose the supply-chain-optimal
assortment.
Our results have some implications regarding the
usage of slotting fees in the grocery industry. Accord-
ing to Bloom et al. (2000), there are two distinct
opinions on slotting fees: proponents argue that slot-
ting fees are tools that enhance channel efficiency,
while opponents maintain that slotting fees are anti-
competitive and merely a source of extra revenue for
retailers. One of the arguments in favor of slotting fees
cited by Bloom and colleagues is that these fees in-
duce retailers to offer products that would otherwise
not make it to the market because of an over satura-
tion of the market with product proliferation. This
argument is further supported by a recent empirical
study: Israilevich (2004) finds that retailers carry some
products that would be unprofitable for them had
they not received slotting fees to stock these products.
Our results give qualified support to this claim. We
find that there exist fees that will induce the retailer
to carry otherwise unprofitable products, thereby
improving the manufacturer’s profit as well. Further-
more, we find that the supply-chain-optimal level of
variety is higher than which that the retailer would be
willing to offer, but a contract that resembles slotting
fees may induce the retailer to offer the supply-chain-
optimal assortment. These observations suggest
that slotting fees may indeed improve supply chain
efficiency.
Here, we model the supply chain as a bilateral mo-
nopoly (i.e., consisting of a single retailer and a single
manufacturer), ignoring the competition at both tiers
of the supply chain. The assumption of bilateral
monopoly is mainly for analytical tractability, but it
also approximates the not-so-rare scenario where a
manufacturer holds such a large market share in a
product category that it comes close to being a mo-
nopoly (e.g., Ehrbar 2005, reports that Eggo has 67%
market share in the frozen waffle category and Gerber
owns 80% of the baby food market). In addition, our
model captures supply relationships in which a prod-
uct line is sold exclusively at a retailer (see Pereira
2001, for examples from the toy industry). Of course, a
bilateral monopoly is the exception rather than the
rule. This simplifying assumption allows us to high-
light the role slotting fees can play in coordinating
assortment decisions. One would need to model man-
ufacturer competition to investigate the claim that
slotting fees are anti-competitive.
In the next section, we discuss the related literature
and position our work with respect to existing re-
search on product line selection, supply chain
coordination, and slotting fees. This is followed by a
discussion of the centralized supply chain in Section
3. Section 4 describes how the decentralized supply
chain differs from the centralized one. In Section 5, we
examine a contract analogous to slotting fees. We an-
alyze the effect of this contract on the manufacturer’s
profits, and we find the conditions under which this
contract coordinates the decentralized supply chain so
as to match the centralized supply chain’s perfor-
mance. In addition, we examine how the coordinating
ability of the contract depends on problem parameters
such as inventory costs and demand variability. A
number of changes to the proposed contract and their
effects are discussed in Section 6. Finally, we conclude
with a discussion of future research directions in Sec-
tion 7. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2. Related Literature
Kök et al. (2008) provide an excellent review of both
the industry practices in assortment planning and the
academic research on the topic. As they point out,
there is little work that incorporates supply chain
considerations into assortment planning. We provide
a contribution to the analysis of assortment planning
problems in supply chains, by highlighting the effect
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of slotting fees on the assortment decisions in a two-
tier supply chain. As such, there are three streams of
research related to the problem we study: (i) product
line selection and pricing, (ii) supply chain coordina-
tion, and (iii) slotting fees. We discuss the relationship
of our work to each of these research streams.
2.1. Product Line Selection and Pricing
The majority of the work in product line selection and
pricing is in the marketing literature. In early treat-
ments of the problem, Mussa and Rosen (1978) and
Moorthy (1984) focus mainly on how cannibalization
within a firm’s product line affects the product offer-
ings and the prices charged. Dobson and Kalish (1988)
formulate the product line selection and pricing prob-
lem as a mixed integer linear program, and devise
heuristics for solving this problem. Chen and Haus-
man (2000) show desirable mathematical properties of
a product line selection and pricing problem where
products are modeled as a collection of attributes.
There is also some research on product line selection
and pricing in the existence of design and manufac-
turing costs. Most of the work in this group follows
the approach taken in Dobson and Kalish (1988), i.e.,
modeling the product line selection and pricing prob-
lem as a mixed integer linear program, and enriching
this model in order to account for manufacturing
complexity associated with product variety. We refer
the reader to Yano and Dobson (1998) for a detailed
review of this literature.
Another line of work in operations management
investigates assortment decisions in the presence of
demand uncertainty and associated inventory consid-
erations. Van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999) consider the
assortment planning and inventory management
problems of a retailer using the MNL choice model.
Rao et al. (2004) analyze a firm’s joint inventory and
assortment decisions in a setting with downward
product substitution, where more costly products can
be used to meet customer demand for less costly
products. It is interesting to note that Rao et al. (2004)
incorporate fixed costs for the inclusion of a product,
which would admit an interpretation as a slotting fee.
Gaur and Honhon (2006) address the joint assortment
and inventory decisions of a retailer using a locational
choice model, which leads to results that are qualita-
tively different from those obtained under the MNL
choice model. Zhaolin (2007) extends van Ryzin and
Mahajan to allow for unequal unit prices and costs
across variants.
Our demand model based on the MNL choice
model follows that of van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999).
Many recent papers also use consumer choice and
demand models that are based on the MNL model to
address assortment-related problems in operations
management (see, e.g., Cachon et al. 2005, Hopp and
Xu 2005, Cachon and Kök 2007, and Maddah and Bish
2007).
2.2. Supply Chain Coordination
The premise of supply chain coordination is that de-
centralized decision-making in a supply chain results
in inferior performance of the chain compared to one
where decision-making is centralized. For a recent
review of the literature on supply chain coordination,
see Cachon (2003). In related work, Kurtuluş and
Toktay (2005) investigate if and when a retailer should
delegate category management decisions (i.e., assort-
ment selection and pricing) to a manufacturer. Akçay
and Tan (2008) identify the conditions that favor in-
dependent producers coming together to combine
their assortments into one. In this paper, we focus on
the effect of decentralization on the assortment of
products offered to the customers. To the best of our
knowledge, the only work that has considered the in-
efficiency introduced to the product line selection
activity as a result of decentralized decision-making is
that of Villas-Boas (1998). He considers a decentral-
ized supply chain where the manufacturer first
decides what assortment to offer to the retailer, and
the retailer then decides which of these products to
carry. The manufacturer charges the retailer a transfer
price and the retailer is free to set the retail price.
Villas-Boas (1998) determines the equilibrium assort-
ment, transfer prices, and retail prices. He focuses on
how the assortments offered by the centralized and
decentralized supply chains are different, and does
not address in detail how a decentralized supply
chain can be coordinated. We explicitly model inven-
tory costs associated with demand uncertainty, while
Villas-Boas (1998) analyzes a setting where all de-
mand is met, eliminating the need for inventory
decisions. However, unlike Villas-Boas (1998), we take
the prices and the manufacturer’s assortment to be
exogenously given.
2.3. Slotting Fees
In addition to the empirical work on slotting fees (e.g.,
Bloom et al. 2000, Israilevich 2004), there have been
some model-based explanations in the literature for
the existence of slotting fees. Most of these explana-
tions come from marketing and economics literature.
Chu (1992) considers a single-manufacturer, single-
retailer channel with information asymmetry regard-
ing the demand for a prospective product: the
manufacturer knows whether the new product will
have high or low demand, but the retailer does not.
Chu shows that the manufacturer of a high-demand
product may agree to pay a slotting fee upon a re-
tailer’s request. Lariviere and Padmanabhan (1997)
show that if there is information asymmetry about the
demand for the prospective product and the retailer
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incurs a fixed cost for carrying the product, then the
manufacturer may willingly offer the retailer a slot-
ting fee for the new product. Desai (2000) shows that
slotting fees may arise even in the absence of infor-
mation asymmetry when there is intense competition
at the retail level. Unlike all of this earlier work, we
model a situation where variants in an assortment
cannibalize each other’s demand (as opposed to con-
sidering the introduction of a single product in
isolation). Furthermore, in our model, the manufac-
turer and the retailer share the same level of
uncertainty about the demand for the products, and
there are inventory-related costs associated with this
demand uncertainty. Our result suggests that even
when there are no issues regarding demand signaling
and no competition at either echelon of the supply
chain, slotting fees may still arise, and they may be in
the interest of both parties in the supply chain.
3. The Centralized Supply Chain
In this section, we describe the model and formulate
the assortment planning and inventory management
problem of a centralized (e.g., vertically integrated)
supply chain. In the centralized supply chain, a single
decision-maker, referred to as ‘‘the firm,’’ both man-
ufactures the products and sells the assortment to the
customers.
3.1. Consumer Choice Model
The firm has n potential products, each of which can
be included in the assortment. We assume that the
price and cost parameters are the same across all po-
tential products. Let p denote the unit retail price and
c the unit procurement cost. All n products serve the
same general purpose for the customer, so each ar-
riving customer observes the assortment offered by
the firm, S  f1, . . ., ng, and decides which product to
purchase, if any. We follow van Ryzin and Mahajan
(1999), who use the MNL model of consumer choice.
The MNL model is a utility-based consumer choice
model in which the stochastic utility of a consumer for
product i, denoted by Ui, is given by Ui 5 ai1ei, where
ai is a fixed term and ei is a random error term that has
a Gumbel distribution with mean zero and shape pa-
rameter m. Here, ai can be interpreted as the average
utility of a customer for product i, assumed to be the
same for all customers. In addition, the customer has
the option of not purchasing from the assortment. A
customer’s utility for the no-purchase option is de-
noted by U0 and given by U0 5 a01e0, where a0 is a
fixed term and e0 is again a random error term with a
Gumbel distribution of mean zero and shape param-
eter m. We assume that, for any given customer, ei’s are
independent across products. Under the MNL model,
a customer chooses the product that maximizes her
utility, and the probability that the customer will
choose product i from assortment S, qi(S), is given by
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for j 5 0, . . ., n. Following the termi-
nology in van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999), we refer to
vj as the preference of the customer population for
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A key property of this choice model is that the more
products there are in assortment S, the smaller the
probability that an arriving customer will not pur-
chase any of the products, i.e., as S gets larger, q0(S)
decreases.
3.2. Inventory Model
We formulate the firm’s inventory control problem as
an infinite-horizon problem with periodic review,
where future cash flows are discounted at a rate of g
per period. This model is similar to the ‘‘replenishable
merchandise’’ model of Mahajan and van Ryzin
(1998). We assume that there is a leadtime of L peri-
ods for the arrival of an order. Following Mahajan and
van Ryzin (1998), we assume that the per-period
demand for product i is normally distributed with a
mean of lqi(S) and variance of (lqi(S))
2b for 0obo1,
where qi(S) is given by (1). In addition, given the
assortment, we assume that the demands are inde-
pendent across products and periods. If b5 0.5, this
demand model reduces to a normal approximation of
Poisson arrivals of customers with a rate of l per pe-
riod, where each customer chooses product i with
probability qi(S). The sequence of the events is as
follows:
(1) At the beginning of a period, the firm observes
the inventory level and the outstanding orders
for a product. The order that was placed L
periods ago arrives.
(2) The firm places an order for each product.
(3) The demand for each product is realized. If
there is leftover inventory for a product, then a
holding cost is incurred. If there is unmet de-
mand for a product, then the unmet demand is
backordered, and a penalty cost is incurred.
We assume that the holding and backorder costs are
linear. Let h denote the unit holding cost per period
and b the penalty cost per unit of backordered de-
mand. In a grocery store setting, some customers,
upon finding that their favorite product is out of
stock, may wait until their next shopping trip to buy
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the item, which supports the assumption of backor-
dering. Nonetheless, there will be other customers
who would rather purchase whatever variant is in
stock. Therefore, a more realistic model would be one
where part of the excess demand for one product
spills over to another. Unfortunately, even the basic
task of determining the optimal stock levels is a chal-
lenge when there is such substitution upon stock-outs.
Therefore, in the interest of analytical tractability, we
assume full backordering of unmet demand. For a
detailed discussion of alternative assumptions on the
effect of stock-outs on consumer choice, see Mahajan
and van Ryzin (1998). In addition, we assume that the
shelf space allocated to the product category is large
enough to allow the retailer to stock optimal quanti-
ties.
3.3. The Optimal Assortment
The problem described above is a standard inventory
control problem, and it is well known that the firm’s
expected discounted holding and backorder costs can
be minimized using a stationary order-up-to policy
for each product. Given assortment S, under the op-
timal inventory control policy, the per-period optimal
expected inventory holding and backordering cost for
product i is given by




where f and F are, respectively, the pdf and cdf for
the standard normal distribution. Let G(S) be the op-
timal expected discounted holding and backordering
cost over the infinite horizon, summed across all
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Using this notation, we can now write
GðSÞ ¼ Gðbþ hÞfsðSÞ:
The expected number of units sold in a period
(summed over all products) is l
P
i2S qiðSÞ (recall that
we assume unmet demand is backordered). Since the
contribution per item sold is p c, the expected gross
profit per period is lðp cÞ
P
i2S qiðSÞ. Subtracting
from this the inventory cost G(S), the net profit of the
firm over the infinite horizon for assortment S  f1,
. . ., ng is given by
PcðSÞ ¼ G lðp cÞ
X
i2S
qiðSÞ  ðbþ hÞfsðSÞ
 !
: ð2Þ





The result below, regarding the form of the optimal
assortment, follows from Mahajan and van Ryzin
(1998).
PROPOSITION 1. (Mahajan and van Ryzin 1998) Assume the
firm has n products to choose from in order to compose its
assortment, and the products are indexed so that
v1  v2      vn. The optimal assortment consists of
the first k products for some kAf1, . . ., ng.
In plain language, Proposition 1 says that the op-
timal assortment consists of a number of products
with the highest customer appeal.
4. The Decentralized Supply Chain
Consider now the decentralized supply chain where
the manufacturer and the retailer are separate entities.
In the decentralized supply chain, the retailer holds
inventories of the products to meet end customer de-
mand, whereas the manufacturer builds to order. As
in the centralized supply chain, the retailer incurs a
holding cost of h per unit per period and a penalty
cost of b per unit of backordered demand. Let w de-
note the wholesale price per unit of product, charged
by the manufacturer to the retailer, and assume that
p  w  c. We assume that all information is common
to both parties in the supply chain.
In our analysis, we assume that the retailer selects
her assortment from the same set of n products avail-
able to the centralized supply chain. This assumption
is not necessarily innocuous. The manufacturer of the
decentralized supply chain might prefer to offer only
a subset of the potential products available in the
centralized supply chain. In Section 6, we provide a
condition under which the manufacturer will find it
optimal to offer the same set of potential products as
the centralized supply chain. When this condition is
not satisfied, the manufacturer may indeed choose to
offer a smaller set of products to the retailer, and we
provide such an example in Section 6.
Let Pdr ðSÞ, PdmðSÞ; and PdscðSÞ denote the expected
profit, respectively, for the retailer, the manufacturer,
and the supply chain when the retailer offers assort-
ment S  f1, . . ., ng. These profit functions are
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given by
Pdr ðSÞ ¼ G lðp wÞ
X
i2S
qiðSÞ  ðbþ hÞfsðSÞ
 !
; ð3Þ




PdscðSÞ ¼ G lðp cÞ
X
i2S
qiðSÞ  ðbþ hÞfsðSÞ
 !
: ð5Þ




The retailer’s optimal assortment will follow the
same form as that of the centralized supply chain,
described in Proposition 1. Throughout the remainder
of the paper, we assume that the products are indexed
so that v1  v2      vn. Let Ak denote the assort-
ment consisting of products 1 through k. Given
Proposition 1, the centralized supply chain’s optimal
assortment will be Akc for some kcAf1, . . ., ng and the
retailer’s optimal assortment will be Akd for some
kdAf1, . . ., ng. The following result compares the re-
tailer-optimal and supply-chain-optimal assortments.
PROPOSITION 2. The centralized supply chain’s optimal as-
sortment is at least as large as the assortment chosen by a
retailer in the decentralized supply chain, i.e., kc  kd.
This result is intuitive, and it is a manifestation of
the double marginalization in the decentralized sup-
ply chain. One implication of Proposition 2 is that
customers have more variety to choose from in the
centralized supply chain.
Note that, in our model, the only type of misalign-
ment between the centralized and decentralized
supply chains is the assortment offered to the cus-
tomers. In particular, if the retailer in the
decentralized supply chain can be induced to offer
the supply-chain-optimal assortment, then the retailer
will find it optimal to use the same order-up-to levels
as in the centralized supply chain (i.e., the products’
inventory levels will be the same in both supply
chains). This is because the unit underage and overage
costs that drive the inventory levels are the same in
both supply chains, due to our assumption of full
backordering; both the centralized and decentralized
supply chains have the same cost of missing one unit
of demand (the unit backorder cost, b) and the same
cost of having an extra unit of inventory at the end of
a period (the unit holding cost per period, h). Alter-
natively, one could assume that all unmet demands
become lost sales, in which case the cost of missing
one unit of demand would be p c for the centralized
supply chain and pw for the retailer in the decen-
tralized supply chain. In such a case, the two supply
chains would differ not only in the assortment deci-
sions but also in inventory levels. Such a supply chain
could be coordinated by a revenue sharing contract
that sets w 5 (1 a)c for some 0oao1 and requires
the retailer to give the manufacturer a fraction a of the
revenue from each unit sold (see Cachon and Larivi-
ere 2005 for a detailed discussion of revenue shar-
ing contracts). In our model, we focus on the full
backordering case to limit our attention to the
misalignment in assortment decisions. Since we wish
to emphasize the role of slotting fees, we focus on a
certain type of contract, one that requires the manu-
facturer to pay a fee for each additional product
carried by the retailer. In the next section, we check if
the manufacturer is willing to pay such fees and we
examine how the assortment decisions can be coordi-
nated through such a contract.
5. The Decentralized Supply Chain
with Slotting Fees
In the status quo in the decentralized supply chain,
the retailer is offering assortment Akd , the assortment
consisting of products 1 through kd. We now consider
a contract where the manufacturer pays the retailer a
fee K for each product offered by the retailer in excess
of kd. Note that this contract strongly resembles slot-
ting fees that retailers require from manufacturers in
order to carry new products offered by manufactur-
ers: in the status quo, the retailer is offering kd
products, and the contract rewards the retailer with
a fee of K per every additional product the retailer
agrees to carry, as slotting fees would do.
Given a fee K, the retailer decides what assortment
it wishes to offer. We impose an additional restriction
on the contract: the retailer’s choice is limited to as-
sortments Aj, jAf1, . . ., ng. In other words, the retailer
can offer any assortment as long as it consists of the
most popular j products for some jAf1, . . ., ng. In
spirit, this restriction is similar to what retailers already
do when choosing assortments. For example, Nelson
(2001) reports that Wal-Mart (who does not charge
slotting fees) ‘‘pressures its store managers to drop
products that don’t sell well and pushes manufacturers
to supply the most popular varieties.’’ In Section 6, we
discuss why this restriction is necessary, and we pro-
vide conditions under which this restriction could be
removed. In addition, in Section 6, we show that some
of our results carry over when the fee is product-spe-
cific instead of being the same for all products.
With the contract in place, the profit of a retailer that
offers products 1 through j is given by
Pdr ðAjÞ þ Kð j kdÞ; if j  kd;
Pdr ðAjÞ; if jokd:
(
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Under such a contract, the retailer will never offer
an assortment with less than kd products (since
assortment Akd is optimal for the retailer in the absence
of fees). Of course, any fee K40 is always agreeable to
the retailer. We next analyze if and when a given fee
K40 is agreeable to the manufacturer.
5.1. The Effect of the Contract on the Manufacturer
Consider assortment Ak, k4kd, and suppose that there
exists a fee K that induces the retailer to offer
assortment Ak. In this section, we analyze if and when
the manufacturer is willing to pay such a fee K.
To begin with, we characterize the conditions that a
given fee K must satisfy in order to induce the retailer
to offer assortment Ak. The fee K will achieve that
result if the following set of inequalities hold:
Pdr ðAkÞ þ Kðk kdÞ  Pdr ðAjÞ þ Kð j kdÞ; j 2 kd; . . . ; n:
Alternatively, one can write the above set of
inequalities as
K  Kðw; kÞ :¼ min
j:kojn




K  Kðw; kÞ :¼ max
j:kdjok




Given the wholesale price, w, the first inequality
requires that K is not so large that the retailer will offer
more than k products. Likewise, the second inequality
requires that K is not so small that the retailer will
offer less than k products. Note that Kðw; kÞ need not
be larger than Kðw; kÞ in general. If Kðw; kÞoKðw; kÞ,
then there exists no fee K40 that will induce the
retailer to offer assortment Ak. On the other hand, at a
given wholesale price w, if Kðw; kÞ  Kðw; kÞ, then any
fee K 2 Kðw; kÞ;Kðw; kÞ
 
will induce the retailer to
offer assortment Ak. The manufacturer will agree to
pay a fee in this range only if the benefit accrued
to the manufacturer from the larger assortment Ak
outweighs the cost of fees to be paid by the
manufacturer. That is, the manufacturer will agree
to pay a fee K 2 Kðw; kÞ;Kðw; kÞ
 
only if the following
inequality is satisfied:
PdmðAkÞ  Kðk kdÞ  Pdm Akd
 	
: ð8Þ









In summary, as long as Kðw; kÞ  Kðw; kÞ, the retai-
ler can be induced to offer assortment Ak and, if
Kmðw; kÞ4Kðw; kÞ, there exist a range of fees, specifi-
cally K 2 ½Kðw; kÞ;Kmðw; kÞ, that the manufacturer is
willing to pay to induce the retailer to offer assort-
ment Ak.
The following proposition states that, as long as
there exists a range of fees that induce the retailer to
offer assortment Ak instead of Akd and the total supply
chain profit is better under assortment Ak than under
any smaller assortment, then a subset of such fees are
agreeable to the manufacturer as well.
PROPOSITION 3. Consider assortment Ak where k4kd. Sup-
pose that the total supply chain profit is strictly higher
under assortment Ak than under any smaller assortment,
that is, PdscðAkÞ4PdscðAjÞ for jok. Furthermore, suppose
that there exists a range of fees that induce the retailer
to offer assortment Ak, that is, Kðw; kÞ  Kðw; kÞ. Then,
Kmðw; kÞ4Kðw; kÞ. Consequently, the manufacturer is
willing to pay any fee K between Kðw; kÞ and
minðKmðw; kÞ;Kðw; kÞÞ.
Proposition 3 suggests that slotting fees may arise in
the interest of both parties in the supply chain. In
particular, our model suggests that slotting fees may
lighten the burden of additional inventory cost borne by
the retailer due to higher variety, thereby making it
profitable for the retailer to carry a larger assortment
and benefiting the manufacturer at the same time. For
this to happen, however, Proposition 3 poses an impor-
tant condition: It is not enough that assortment Ak
improves the total supply chain profit compared to as-
sortment Akd ; the larger assortment Ak must be better for
the supply chain than any smaller assortment Aj; jok.
Indeed, when this condition does not hold, it is easy to
find examples where the retailer can be induced to offer
assortment Ak, but the manufacturer is not willing to
pay any of the fees that achieve such inducement.
There exists at least one assortment that is larger
than Akd and better for the supply chain than any
smaller assortment: the supply-chain-optimal assort-
ment, Akc . One consequence of Proposition 3 is that if
there exists a range of fees that will induce the retailer
to offer the supply-chain-optimal assortment, then
some of those fees are agreeable to the manufacturer.
We next analyze if and when such coordinating fees exist.
5.2. Coordination through Slotting Fees
At a given wholesale price w, in order for a fee K to
induce the retailer to offer assortment Akc , we must
have Kðw; kcÞ  Kðw; kcÞ and K 2 ½Kðw; kcÞ;Kðw; kcÞ.
In preparation for the main result of this section,
the following lemma characterizes the behavior of
Kðw; kcÞ and Kðw; kcÞ with respect to w.
LEMMA 1. There exists a ~w 2 ½c; pÞ such that
(a) The supply chain is trivially coordinated, i.e.,
kd 5 kc, for w 2 ½c; ~w.
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(b) Kðw; kcÞ40 and Kðw; kcÞ  0 for w 2 ð~w; p.
(c) limw!~wþ Kðw; kcÞ  Kðw; kcÞ
 	
40.
(d) Kðw; kcÞ  Kðw; kcÞ is decreasing in w for
w 2 ð~w; p.
When the wholesale price w is very close to the
production cost c, double marginalization is not
strong enough to cause a difference between the re-
tailer-optimal and supply-chain-optimal assortments.
That is why the supply chain is trivially coordinated
when the wholesale price is less than or equal to some
threshold ~w. Now, once the wholesale price exceeds ~w,
a strictly positive fee will be needed to induce
the retailer to choose the supply-chain-optimal as-
sortment. Lemma 1(b) and (c) together indicate that
Kðw; kcÞ starts below Kðw; kcÞ, but catches up as w in-
creases beyond ~w. This observation implies that when
the wholesale price is not too high compared to ~w,
there exist coordinating fees (i.e., the fees
K 2 Kðw; kcÞ;Kðw; kcÞ
 
), but we may not be able to
find such a coordinating fee once the wholesale price
in the supply chain becomes sufficiently high. The
following proposition formalizes this result and more.
PROPOSITION 4. There exists a threshold wholesale price w
2 ð~w; p such that if w 2 ð~w;w, then there exists a fee
K40 that the manufacturer is willing to pay and that
induces the retailer to offer the supply-chain-optimal as-
sortment, Akc .
Proposition 4 implies that the lower the wholesale
price, the more likely we are to encounter coordinat-
ing fees that also make the manufacturer better off.
Hence, when the wholesale price is not too high, slot-
ting fees may enhance supply chain efficiency by
inducing the retailer to choose the supply-chain-
optimal assortment, while making the manufacturer
better off as well.
An example is depicted in Figure 1. The problem
parameters for this figure are based loosely on the
data that Israilevich (2004) provides for the average
weekly sales and prices (in 1989 dollars) of several
kinds of bath tissue at a Chicago supermarket chain.
We took similarly priced, four-roll packages as our
potential set of products. This set consists of seven
distinct products.1
In this example, kc 5 4. The left-panel plots Kðw; kcÞ
and Kðw; kcÞ. When the wholesale price is less than
roughly 0.6 (the production cost and retail price are
0.34 and 1.02, respectively), we have kc 5 kd, i.e., the
supply chain is trivially coordinated (in this region,
we plot Kðw; kcÞ ¼ 0; note that Kðw; kcÞ is in fact un-
defined in this region). For any wholesale price larger
than 0.6, a positive fee will be needed to induce the
retailer to offer the supply-chain-optimal assortment.
We observe from Figure 1 that Kðw; kcÞ  Kðw; kcÞ for
wholesale prices less than roughly 0.84. Consequently,
if the wholesale price is between 0.6 and 0.84, this
supply chain can be coordinated by the use of a per-
product fee. On the other hand, if the wholesale price
is above 0.84, then there exists no fee that will achieve
coordination. In this example with p 5 1.02 and
c 5 0.34, a wholesale price of 0.84 implies a profit
margin division of 50:18 for the manufacturer/retailer,
or about 3/4 of the entire profit margin going to the
manufacturer. As long as the manufacturer’s portion
of the profit margin is smaller than about 3/4, it will
be possible to find a fee that will induce the retailer to
choose the supply-chain-optimal assortment. It is
interesting to note that, according to the data we are
adapting from Israilevich (2004), the average whole-
sale price of the seven items in our set of potential
products is 0.81, which is just below the threshold
wholesale price. The right-panel of the figure focuses
on the region of wholesale prices where the supply
chain is not trivially coordinated and plots the largest
fee the manufacturer is willing to pay, Km. As already
established in Proposition 4, at any wholesale price
where the retailer can be induced to offer the supply-



























































































Figure 1 The Left Panel Depicts Kðw; kcÞ and Kðw;kcÞ as a Function of the Wholesale Price. The Right Panel Focuses on the Region of Wholesale Prices
Where the Supply Chain is not Trivially Coordinated and Shows Kmðw;kcÞ in Addition to Kðw;kcÞ and Kðw; kcÞ. The Parameter Values are:
k 5 1430, C 5 500, p 5 1.024, c 5 0.349, n 5 7, b 5 0.3, h 5 0.015, L 5 4, b 5 0.5, v0 5 0.5, v1 5 32.937, v2 5 23.287, v3 5 14.056, v4 5 13.217,
v5 5 6.014, v6 5 5.664, v7 5 4.825
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that the manufacturer is willing to pay so that the
retailer will offer the supply-chain-optimal assort-
ment. In fact, in this example, it so happens that the
fees that induce the retailer to offer the supply-chain-
optimal assortment, K 2 ½Kðw; kcÞ;Kðw; kcÞ, are well
below the maximum fee that the manufacturer would
be willing to pay to achieve that result, Kmðw; kcÞ.
5.3. Sensitivity Analysis
We first discuss the effect of inventory-related param-
eters on the range of coordinating fees. We then
discuss the effect of such parameters on the threshold
wholesale price.
5.3.1. Coordinating Fees at a Given Wholesale
Price. Figure 2 shows how Kðw; kcÞ, Kðw; kcÞ and
Kmðw; kcÞ depend on the unit holding cost per
period, h, at a given wholesale price, w. The
behaviors with respect to the unit backorder cost, b,
and the leadtime, L, are similar.
First, leaving aside the discontinuities for now, we
observe that a marginal increase in h results in an
increase in both Kðw; kcÞ and Kðw; kcÞ. To understand
this behavior, note that when h increases, carrying a
product becomes more costly and, therefore, the
minimum fee that will induce the retailer to offer
the supply-chain-optimal assortment, Kðw; kcÞ, in-
creases. Likewise, since carrying a product becomes
more costly, the manufacturer can give the retailer
larger fees without the retailer choosing to offer an
assortment larger than the supply-chain-optimal as-
sortment. Hence, a marginal increase in h causes an
increase in Kðw; kcÞ. The discontinuities in Kðw; kcÞ
correspond to changes in the supply-chain-optimal
assortment. As h increases and the supply-chain-
optimal assortment shrinks, the disparity between
the retailer-optimal and supply-chain-optimal as-
sortments is reduced. This makes it easier to induce
the retailer to offer the supply-chain-optimal assort-
ment, which explains the downward jumps in
Kðw; kcÞ. The same discontinuities occur in Kðw; kcÞ
as well, even though they are harder to detect from
the figure.
Notice from the figure that a marginal increase in h
does not change the largest fee that the manufacturer
is willing to pay, Kmðw; kcÞ. This fee is a measure of
the improvement in the manufacturer’s profit when
the retailer switches from the retailer-optimal assort-
ment to the supply-chain-optimal assortment. This
improvement in the manufacturer’s profit does not
depend on the holding cost h unless the retailer-
optimal assortment or the supply-chain-optimal as-
sortment changes in reaction to a change in the
holding cost. Indeed, the upward jumps in Kmðw; kcÞ
occur because the supply-chain-optimal assortment
shrinks at those points, reducing the gap between
retailer-optimal and supply-chain-optimal assort-
ments. Hence, the number of additional products
that the manufacturer is pushing onto the retailer
decreases, which causes an increase in the per-prod-
uct fee the manufacturer is willing to pay.
Given that a marginal increase in h pushes up the
range of coordinating fees while leaving unchanged
the largest fee that the manufacturer is willing to
pay, one would expect that a marginal increase in h
may narrow down the range of fees that coordinate
while leaving the manufacturer better off. An exam-
ple occurs in this figure when h is in the
neighborhood of 0.038. In that region, Kðw; kcÞ gets
progressively closer to Kmðw; kcÞ. In fact, when h is
slightly above 0.038, the interval ½Kðw; kcÞ;Kmðw; kcÞ
almost vanishes, and only a tiny range of fees will
coordinate the supply chain while making the man-
ufacturer better off.
Another interesting observation from Figure 2 is
the behavior when h is roughly in between 0.04 and
0.06. In that region, both Kðw; kcÞ and Kmðw; kcÞ are
zero, indicating that the supply chain is trivially co-
ordinated, that is, the retailer-optimal and supply-
chain-optimal assortments are the same. This region
of h, however, is preceded by a region where it
would take a positive fee to coordinate the supply
chain. Thus, a higher holding cost does not always
translate to a requirement of higher coordinating
fees. This observation sheds further light on the use
of slotting fees in the grocery industry. An FTC re-
port finds that slotting fees are the highest for frozen
and refrigerated items. Retailers explain these high
slotting fees by noting that (i) the cost of operating
the shelf space and the cost of storage are higher for
such items, and (ii) shelf space is less readily avail-
able for such items (Klie, 2004). In other words,
retailers claim that they should charge high slotting
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Figure 2 Kðw; kcÞ, Kðw;kcÞ and Kmðw;kcÞ as Functions of h. All Pa-
rameter Values are the Same as in Figure 1, Except that h is
Allowed to Vary and w is Fixed at 0.6865
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high inventory-related costs. As shown in Figure 2, a
small increase in the unit holding cost, h, does push
up the range of coordinating fees, seemingly sup-
porting the retailers’ claim. Nonetheless, the lesson
from Figure 2 is that, when it comes to the size of
coordinating fees, the level of disparity between the
retailer-optimal and supply-chain-optimal assort-
ments matters just as much, and this disparity is
not necessarily getting worse as the inventory hold-
ing costs increase. Therefore, if the slotting fees
required by retailers are meant to enhance channel
efficiency (as opposed to merely improving the
retailers’ revenues), then it is not enough for the
retailers to claim that the slotting fees for refrigerated
items are high because of the high inventory-related
costs. They also need to demonstrate that the
disparity between the retailer- and supply-chain-
optimal assortments is large enough to justify the
large slotting fees.
5.3.2. The Threshold Wholesale Price. According
to our model, the effect of per-product fees on a
supply chain is critically dependent on the wholesale
price in the supply chain. If the wholesale price is
above a threshold level, then such fees may fail to
induce the retailer to choose the supply-chain-optimal
assortment. In addition, at any wholesale price below
the threshold wholesale price, a subset of the fees that
achieve coordination also make the manufacturer
better off. Next, we discuss how the threshold
wholesale price depends on inventory-related
parameters.
Figure 3 shows how the threshold wholesale price,
w, depends on the unit holding cost per period, h.
The behaviors with respect to the unit backorder
cost, b, and the leadtime, L, are similar. Observe from
the figure that a marginal increase in h results in a
decrease in the threshold wholesale price, w. There-
fore, after a marginal increase in h, coordination is
possible for a narrower range of wholesale prices.
Nonetheless, as h continues to grow, the supply-
chain-optimal assortment shrinks, rendering the re-
tailer- and supply-chain-optimal assortments closer
to each other. This makes it easier to find fees that
coordinate the assortment decisions in the supply
chain. Hence, every time the supply-chain-optimal
assortment shrinks, the threshold wholesale price,
w, jumps upward, indicating a growth in the range
of wholesale prices under which coordination is
possible.
We next discuss the behavior of the threshold
wholesale price, w, with respect to b, which deter-
mines the coefficient of variation of demand. Note
that in a supply chain that offers assortment S, the
coefficient of variation for the demand of product
iAS is given by ðlqiðSÞÞb1. Therefore, as b increases,
the coefficient of variation for product i’s demand
may increase or decrease, depending on whether l
qiðSÞ41 or not. Because an increase in b can move
the coefficient of variation in either direction, one
can observe a large variety of behavior regarding the
effect of b on w. Figure 4 shows two different ex-
amples. In the example shown in the left-hand panel,
as b increases, the supply-chain-optimal assortment
gets larger. Every time the supply-chain-optimal
assortment gets larger, the disparity between the re-
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Figure 3 The Threshold Wholesale Price w as a Function of h. All Parameter


























































































































Figure 4 The Threshold Wholesale Price w (Expressed as a Percentage of the Retail Price, p) as a Function of b. In the Left-Hand Panel, k 5 C 5 1, p 5 70,
c 5 20, n 5 10, b 5 5, h 5 1, L 5 2. In the Right-Hand Panel, k 5 10, C 5 1, p 5 70, c 5 65, n 5 10, b 5 5, h 5 1, L 5 2. Both Panels Use v0 5 80 with
the Following Randomly Generated vi Values for i 5 1, . . ., 10: v1 5 178.997, v2 5 177.385, v3 5 162.962, v4 5 150.005, v5 5 132.970, v6 5 113.711,
v7 5 122.136, v8 5 98.464, v9 5 93.827, v1 5 92.439
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which makes it more difficult to induce the retailer to
offer the supply-chain-optimal assortment. This
growing disparity results in a smaller w, indicating
that coordination can be achieved for a narrower
range of wholesale prices. This behavior changes
only when b becomes as large as 0.7. Once b becomes
that large, the optimal action for the supply chain is
to offer all products, and there is no longer an upper
bound on the coordinating fee (since there is no
longer a concern that the retailer will offer more than
the supply-chain-optimal assortment), and one can
always find a fee large enough to induce the retailer
to offer all the products. On the other hand, in the
example shown in the right-hand panel, w makes an
upward jump early on. This upward jump occurs at
a point where the supply-chain-optimal assortment
shrinks, rendering the retailer- and supply-chain-
optimal assortments closer to each other.
6. Alternative Contracts
In this section, we discuss how the results would
change under certain changes to the contract pro-
posed in Section 5.
6.1. Restriction to Offer an Assortment Aj
The contract proposed in Section 5 restricts the retailer
to offer an assortment Aj for some jAf1, . . ., ng (recall
that products are numbered in descending order of
preference values, and Aj denotes the assortment con-
taining products 1 through j). The form of the optimal
policy described in Proposition 1 does not imply that
the best way to choose j products is to select the j
products with the highest preference values; i.e., al-
though the optimal solution will be assortment Aj for
some jAf1, . . ., ng, the optimal assortment of j prod-
ucts for some jAf1, . . ., ng is not necessarily Aj. If the
contract does not require that the retailer choose as-
sortment Aj for some jAf1, . . ., ng, then we might run
into situations where the contract induces the retailer
to offer kc products, but the retailer chooses an as-
sortment of kc products other than Akc . Consider the
example shown in Table 1. In this example, kd 5 1 and
kc 5 2. By requiring the retailer to offer assortment Aj
for some jAf1, . . ., ng and using a fee K 5 20, the con-
tract induces the retailer to offer assortment A2, which
is the supply-chain-optimal assortment. If the retailer
were not limited to assortments Aj, then the retailer
could choose to carry products 1 and 5, which is an
improvement over assortment A2 for the retailer. Such
an action will also cause the manufacturer’s profit to
worsen, since the additional revenue the manufac-
turer makes from product 5 is outweighed by the fee
the manufacturer needs to pay to the retailer. The
contract discussed in the previous section avoids such
a possibility by limiting the retailer to offering Aj for-
some jAf1, . . ., ng. Note that, even with such a
limitation, the retailer is better off under the contract.
Furthermore, the following proposition states suffi-
cient conditions on problem parameters under which
the retailer will choose an assortment of the form Aj
for some jAf1, . . ., ng, even when it is not explicitly
required to do so.
PROPOSITION 5. Let D ¼
Pn1
i¼1 ðvi  vnÞ;M ¼ lðp wÞ;





; then the optimal assortment of j products is Aj.
The condition of Proposition 5 guarantees that, for
any jAf1, . . ., ng, the optimal assortment with j prod-
ucts is Aj. Therefore, if the condition holds, then the
contract does not need to limit the retailer to choose
an assortment of the form Aj, as it is already in the
retailer’s best interest to do so. The larger M 5
l(pw) is with respect to Z ¼ ðbþ hÞfðlðLþ 1ÞÞb,
the more likely the condition of Proposition 5 is to be
satisfied, i.e., the larger the profit margin compared to
the inventory-associated cost, the more likely it is that
the condition will be satisfied.
Another way to remove this restriction would be to
impose an alternative restriction on the manufacturer:
If the manufacturer of the decentralized supply chain
lets the retailer choose from only products 1 though kc,
then the retailer will offer assortment Akc as long as
the fee K exceeds a certain limit.
6.2. Product-Specific Fees
In our earlier analysis, we assume that the retailer is
paid a fee K for each product offered in excess of as-
Table 1 If the Retailer is not Restricted to Choose an Assortment of the
Form f1, . . ., jg for Some j, the Contract May Result in the Retailer
Choosing an Assortment of kc Products Other than f1, . . ., kcg
Assortment Retailer profit Manufacturer profit Supply chain profit
Profits without any fees
{1} 1001.52 909.09 1910.61
{1,2} 983.99 941.18 1925.17
{1,2,3} 955.57 952.38 1907.95
{1, . . ., 4} 929.49 956.52 1886.01
{1, . . ., 5} 917.98 956.90 1874.87
Profits with fee K 5 20
{1} 1001.52 909.09 1910.61
{1,2} 1003.99 921.18 1925.17
{1,2,3} 995.57 912.38 1907.95
{1, . . ., 4} 989.49 896.52 1886.01
{1, . . ., 5} 997.98 876.90 1874.87
{1,5} 1005.90 890.70 1896.60
In this example, G5 100, l ¼ ðbþ hÞf ¼ L ¼ 1; p w ¼ 12:5;w c ¼
10; v0 ¼ 5; v1 ¼ 50; v2 ¼ 30; v3 ¼ 20; v4 ¼ 10; v5 ¼ 1:
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sortment Akd . Suppose now that the manufacturer an-
nounces a fee Ki for product i =2Akd and promises to
pay the retailer Ki if the retailer adds product i to its
assortment. In particular, let Ki 5 K1di for i=2Akd,
where K  0 can be interpreted as a base fee and
di  0 can be interpreted as an additional fee, specific
to product i. Can one find K and di for i=2Akd so that the
retailer will offer the supply-chain-optimal assort-
ment? The following proposition answers this
question in the affirmative.
PROPOSITION 6. Suppose the products are indexed in de-
scending order of vi’s, i.e., v1  v2      vn and the
retailer is required to offer an assortment of the form
Aj 5 f1, . . ., jg. Suppose the manufacturer pays the retailer
a fee K1di for offering product i=2Akd . There exists a w 2
½~w; p such that if w  w then there exist K  0 and di  0
that will induce the retailer to offer the supply-chain-
optimal assortment Akc .
Note that one way to pick di’s is to choose
dkdþ1  dkdþ2      dn, in which case the manufac-
turer offers larger fees for products with larger
preference values. In some cases, such a flexibility
may actually help remove from the contract the re-
striction to offer an assortment of the form Aj. For
instance, in the example shown in Table 1, if the
manufacturer picks d2 to be sufficiently larger than d5,
then the retailer will have no incentive to offer as-
sortment f1,5g any longer and will offer assortment
f1,2g instead. Such an outcome could be achieved, for
example, by setting K 5 0, d1 5 d3 5 d4 5 d5 5 0, and
picking any d2417.53.
6.3. Paying a Fee for Each Product Offered
In the contract of the previous section, the retailer re-
ceives a per-product fee only for products offered in
excess of assortment Akd . One could change the con-
tract so that the manufacturer pays the retailer a per-
product fee for all products offered by the retailer. In
such a case, the result summarized in Proposition 4
continues to hold, i.e., there still exists a per-product
fee that induces the retailer to offer kc products, pro-
vided that the wholesale price is below a threshold.
With such a payment scheme, the manufacturer will
now agree to pay a coordinating fee K 2
Kðw; kcÞ;Kðw; kcÞ
 
only if the following inequality is
satisfied:
Pdm Akcð Þ  K  kc  Pdm Akd
 	
:




K  KmðwÞ :¼




Figure 5 depicts a numerical example where
Kðw; kcÞand Kðw; kcÞ and the updated km(w) are plot-
ted as functions of the wholesale price (expressed as
the percentage of the retail price). Notice from the
figure that the existence of coordinating fees no longer
guarantees that some of those fees will make the
manufacturer better off. In this example there exist
two ranges of wholesale prices (from 45% to 51% and
from 66% to 77%) where there is a fee K that induces
the retailer to offer assortment Akc while making the














































































Wholesale price, w*, as a % of retail price, p
K_Low K_Up K_m (all as a % of retail price, p)
Figure 5 When the Wholesale Price is Between Roughly 51% and 66% of the Retail Price, There Exist Fees that Induce the Retailer to Offer Assortment
Akc , but None of Those Fees Make the Manufacturer Better Off. In This Example, k 5 1, C 5 1000, p 5 70, c 5 20, n 5 10, b 5 10, h 5 1, L 5 2,
b 5 0.5, v0 5 80, v1 5 226.362, v2 5 202.766, v3 5 197.944, v4 5 173.863, v5 5 171.919, v6 5 168.678, v7 5 165.169, v8 5 127.962, v7 5 117.164,
v10 5 94.885
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Kðw; kcÞ  K  Kðw; kcÞ and K  Km(w). However,
these two ranges are separated by a range of whole-
sale prices (from 51% to 66%) where the retailer can be
induced to offer assortment Akc , but none of the fees
that achieve this result make the manufacturer better
off.
6.4. Strategic Manufacturer
One of our assumptions in Section 5 is that there exists
a given set of n products from which the retailer
makes her assortment selection. Another approach
would be to assume that the manufacturer has a set of
n potential products, and the manufacturer decides
which of these n products to let the retailer choose
from, i.e., the manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg
leader in deciding what products to offer to the re-
tailer. In such a case, the manufacturer would not
necessarily make all n products available to the re-
tailer. Consider the example depicted in Table 2.
In this example, the manufacturer decides which of
the eight potential products to make available to the
retailer. If the manufacturer lets the retailer choose
from all eight products, the retailer will offer products
1 through 4 in its assortment. However, if the
manufacturer decides not to make product 2 avail-
able, then the retailer will offer products 1, 3, 4, 5, and
6, which provides the manufacturer with a profit
greater than the assortment of products 1 through 4.
Therefore, in the example shown in Table 2, the man-
ufacturer will never make all products available to the
retailer. Under certain conditions, however, it will al-
ways be optimal for the manufacturer to make all
potential products available. The following proposi-
tion states such a sufficient condition.
PROPOSITION 7. Suppose the products are indexed in de-
scending order of vi’s, i.e., v1  v2      vn and the
retailer is required to offer an assortment of the form
Aj 5 f1, . . ., jg. If vi4
Pn
j¼iþ1 vj for i 5 1, . . ., n 1, then
the manufacturer will offer the retailer all the potential
products, i.e., the manufacturer will let the retailer choose
from f1, . . ., ng.
Given the set of potential products f1, . . ., ng, Prop-
osition 7 can be interpreted as saying that if there is a
large gap between the preference values of the prod-
ucts, then the manufacturer is best off by letting the
retailer choose from all potential products. If this con-
dition were to hold, product i in assortment S would
have a larger purchase probability than all the less
popular products in assortment S combined. Hence,
this condition may be too stringent in many practical
cases. Nonetheless, given this condition, it is not too
surprising that the example depicted in Table 2 leads
to a situation where the manufacturer would like to
eliminate some of the products: in that example, the vi
values are very close for many products.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we considered the coordination of as-
sortment planning in a supply chain. We showed that,
as one would expect, the centralized chain offers at
least as many products as the decentralized one, since
the centralized supply chain does not suffer from
double marginalization. We then considered the
effects of a contract that requires the manufacturer
to pay a fee to the retailer per product the retailer
carries in excess of a certain target level. This payment
scheme is significant, since it strongly resembles slot-
ting fees used in the grocery industry. We showed that
if the wholesale price in the decentralized supply
chain is below some threshold level, then such fees
will induce the retailer to offer supply-chain-optimal
assortment. Furthermore, the contract is guaranteed to
make both parties better off. Interestingly, once the
wholesale price exceeds the threshold level, there
exists no fee that will induce the retailer to offer
the supply-chain-optimal assortment.
The model of this paper is particularly applicable in
the case of retailers whose profit margins are not too
high compared to their inventory-related costs, e.g.,
grocery stores. The low profit margins of grocery
stores make it less attractive to carry large assortments
unless the manufacturer provides an extra incentive.
Table 2 An Example Where the Manufacturer Would Not Make All Potential
Products Available
Assortment Retailer Profit Manufacturer Profit




{1, . . ., 4} 1754.1 945.6
{1, . . ., 5} 1752.9 953.2
{1, . . ., 6} 1749.0 958.8
{1, . . ., 7} 1743.2 962.6
{1, . . ., 8} 1735.7 964.4






{1,3,4, . . ., 7} 1741.2 954.5
{1,3,4, . . ., 8} 1734.4 957.2
In this example, G5 100, l ¼ L ¼ 1; ðbþ hÞf ¼ 0:5; p w ¼ 20;
w c ¼ 10;b ¼ 0:5; v0 ¼ 8; v1 ¼ 39; v2 ¼ 38; v3 ¼ 37; v4 ¼ 25; v5 ¼ 24;
v6 ¼ 23; v7 ¼ 20; v8 ¼ 11.
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Therefore, it is not too surprising that slotting fees
appear to be more widely used by grocery stores than
other types of retailers. Interestingly enough, some
powerful retailers avoid slotting fees despite their
bargaining power, e.g., Wal-Mart. One possible expla-
nation is that such retailers are able to obtain low
wholesale prices, which then makes it attractive for
them to carry a large assortment without any need for
slotting fees. In fact, Jacoby (2004) comments that Wal-
Mart tells its suppliers that ‘‘they earn shelf space
with rock-bottom wholesale prices,’’ as opposed to
requiring slotting fees but accepting higher wholesale
prices. In general, slotting fees appear to be less com-
mon in retail settings where retailer’s margins are
significantly high, e.g., fashion apparel. This is prob-
ably because the high profit margins in such settings
provide enough incentive for the retailer to offer large
assortments in the first place.
While in our model the wholesale price is exoge-
nously fixed, it may be possible in practice for the
manufacturer to set the wholesale price. When choos-
ing the wholesale price, the trade-off for the
manufacturer is that a larger wholesale price increases
its unit profit margin, but decreases the size of the
assortment chosen by the retailer. Hence, even if the
wholesale price were optimally chosen, the manufac-
turer would still leave some profit margin to the
retailer and double marginalization would continue to
exist. Thus, the discrepancy between the retailer-
optimal and supply-chain-optimal assortments would
still be around and the manufacturer may still stand
to gain from slotting fees. Nonetheless, it is possible
that the fees that are agreeable to the manufacturer
would be smaller when the manufacturer is able to
choose the wholesale price.
We assumed that the retailer bears all the inventory
holding and shortage costs. One could change the
contract so that the supply chain uses consignment,
i.e., the manufacturer incurs the inventory holding
and shortage cost instead of the retailer. In such a case,
even in the absence of any fees, the retailer would
choose to offer all available products. This follows
from the fact that sales volume increases with variety,
and the only cost in our model that is keeping the
retailer from offering all available variety is the in-
ventory cost. However, such an outcome is not
necessarily desirable, unless the supply-chain-opti-
mal solution happens to be to offer all products.
How the manufacturer should design its set of
potential products is an interesting question. In order
to address this problem, future research may con-
sider the use of models where the assortment is a
continuum of products as opposed to our model
where products are discrete; such a model of product
differentiation is likely to render the problem more
tractable.
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Appendix
We first provide the proofs of the propositions. This is
followed by the proof of Lemma 1, which is stated in
the body of the paper. Lemma 2 is stated and proved
here in the Appendix.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: Throughout the proof, recall
that the products are indexed so that v1  v2
     vn  0. Substituting for Pc(Ak) and Pdr ðAkÞ
from Equations (2) and (3), we can write the difference
of the two profit functions as













creasing in k. Hence, PcðAkÞ Pdr ðAkÞ is increasing
in k. Now, the proof is by contradiction. Suppose
kd4kc. Then, since P
cðAkÞ Pdr ðAkÞ is increasing in k,




 Pc Akcð Þð










However, this leads to a contradiction, since Akd
maximizes Pdr and Akc maximizes Pc. Therefore, we
cannot have kd4kc, which concludes the proof. &
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: In order to prove the propo-
sition, it suffices to prove that Kmðw; kÞ  Kðw; kÞ.
From the definitions of Kmðw; kÞ and Kðw; kÞ, given by
(9) and (7), respectively:










Notice that, for any assortment S, Pdr ðSÞ ¼
PdscðSÞ PdmðSÞ. Therefore, we can write:
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It follows from the condition that PdscðAkÞ
 PdscðAjÞ for all k4j:











Now, from the definition of PdmðAkÞ given by (4),






















average value of vj11 through vk, and vi’s are in
descending order, i.e., v1  v2      vn). Therefore,
PdmðAkÞPdmðAjÞ











Now, combining (A1) and (A2), we can write:
Kmðw; kÞ  Kðw; kÞ  0;
which concludes the proof. &
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: First, note from Lemma 1(b)
that Kðw; kcÞ40 and Kðw; kcÞ  0 for w4~w. In addi-
tion, Lemma 1(c) shows that limw!~wþKðw; kcÞ
4limw!~wþKðw; kcÞ. Now, since Kðw; kcÞ  Kðw; kcÞ is
decreasing in w (by Lemma 1(c)), there exists w 2
~w; pð  such that Kðw; kcÞ4Kðw; kcÞ  0 for wow.
Therefore, at any wholesale price w such that wow,
the retailer can be induced to offer the supply-chain-
optimal assortment Akc by picking a fee K 2 Kðw; kcÞ;½
Kðw; kcÞ. By definition, the supply-chain-optimal
assortment Akc is better for the supply chain
than any smaller assortment Aj; jokc. Hence, for
wow 2 ~w; pð Þ, it follows from Proposition 3 that
the manufacturer is willing to pay any fee
K 2 Kðw; kcÞ;min Kðw; kcÞ;Kmðw; kcÞ
 	 
. &
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: The proposition holds trivially
when j 5 n. Suppose S is the best assortment with jon
products, and assume for a contradiction that
S6¼f1, . . ., jg. Then there must exist a pair of products
i and k such that ieS, kAS and vn  vkovi. We know
from Lemma 2 that if we replace k with i, then Pdr ðSÞ
will improve. Therefore, S cannot be the optimal
assortment with j products, yielding a contradiction,
which concludes the proof. &
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6: In order for the retailer to offer
the supply-chain-optimal assortment Akc , K and di for
i=2Akd must satisfy the following:




 Pdr ðAkÞ þ Kðk kdÞ þ
Xk
i¼kdþ1
di; k 2 fkd; . . . ; ng:
Alternatively, we can write the above set of in-
equalities as
K  K0ðw; kcÞ :
¼ min
k:kcokn






K  K0ðw; kcÞ :
¼ max
k:kdkokc






Now, an analog of Lemma 1 can be proven for
K
0ðw; kcÞand K0ðw; kcÞ. Here, we provide only a sketch
of the proof. To see why K
0ðw; kcÞ  0 and K0ðw; kcÞ  0
for w 2 ð~w; p (analogous to Lemma 1(b)), note that we
can always pick di values small enough to satisfy this
condition. Now, given any set of fixed di values,
the result that K
0ðw; kcÞ  K0ðw; kcÞ is decreasing in w
(analogous to Lemma 1(d)) follows from the same line
of reasoning as in Lemma 1(d). Given an analog of
Lemma 1 holds for K
0ðw; kcÞ and K0ðw; kcÞ, the
existence of w below which the retailer can be
induced to offer the supply-chain-optimal assortment
follows. &
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7: Let A denote the entire set of
products, f1, . . ., ng, and let S ¼ f1; . . . ; kg be the
optimal assortment chosen by the retailer when
the retailer is offered A by the manufacturer. Suppose
the manufacturer removes sets B and C from the set of
products offered to the retailer (i.e., the manufacturer
lets the retailer choose from A=ðB [ CÞ) where B  S
and C  A=S. The retailer will now choose ðS=BÞ [D
for some D  A=ðS [ CÞ. Therefore, the manufacturer
will prefer to offer the retailer A=ðB [ CÞ instead of A
only if PdmððS=BÞ [DÞ4PdmðSÞ, which will be the
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j2B vj (this can be verified using the
definition of PdmðÞ in (4) and noting thatP





). However, if vi4
Pn
j¼iþ1 vj
for i ¼ 1; . . . ; n 1, then there does not exist B  S,
C  A=S and D  A=ðS [ CÞ such that
P
j2D vj4P
j2B vj (to see why this is true, recall that products
are indexed so that v1  v2  . . .  vn, and note that
the products in set B have lower indices than those in
D). Hence, if vi4
Pn
j¼iþ1 vj for i ¼ 1; . . . ; n 1, then
there does not exist B  S and C  A=S such that the
manufacturer will prefer to offer the retailer A=ðB [ CÞ
instead of A. &
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: First, note that the existence of ~w
follows from the fact that kd 5 kc for w 5 c. Next, we
prove parts (b) and (c) of the lemma.
PROOF OF (b): To see why Kðw; kcÞ40 for w 2 ð~w; p, first
note that, using Equations (3), (4) and (5), we can
write
Pdr Akcð Þ Pdr Akð Þ ¼ Pdsc Akcð Þ Pdsc Akð Þ þPdm Akð Þ
Pdm Akcð Þ:
Now, Pdsc Akcð Þ PdscðAkÞ  0, since assortment
Akc maximizes P
d
sc. Also, for k4kc, P
d
m Akð Þ Pdm Akcð Þ
40 follows from the fact that
Pk
i¼1 qiðAkÞ is strictly
increasing in k. Therefore, Pdr Akcð Þ Pdr ðAkÞ40 for
k4kc. Hence, it follows from the definition of Kðw; kÞ,
given by (6), that Kðw; kcÞ40.
It remains to show Kðw; kcÞ  0. Note that by defi-
nition of ~w, kc 6¼ kd for w 2 ð~w; p. Therefore,
Pdr Akd
 	
Pdr Akcð Þ  0. Now, it follows from the defi-
nition of Kðw; kÞ, given by (7), that Kðw; kcÞ  0 for
w 2 ð~w; p.
PROOF OF (c): First, we show that limw!~wþKðw; kcÞ40.
From the definition of Kðw; kÞ, given by (6), we have:
lim
w!~wþ















Now, noting that PdscðAkcÞPdscðAjÞ  0 for j 6¼kc and
PdmðAjÞ PdmðAkcÞ40 for j4kc, it follows from the
above equation that limw!~wþKðw; kcÞ40.
Next, we show that limw!~wþKðw; kcÞ ¼ 0. From the
definition of Kðw; kÞ, given by (7), we have
lim
w!~wþ









Observe that, once the wholesale price w is ~wþ e for
an arbitrarily small e40, the retailer-optimal assort-
ment in the decentralized supply chain, Akd , differs
from the supply-chain-optimal assortment by only
one product, that is, Akd ¼ Akc1 as w! ~w
þ. Applying
this observation to (A4) yields:
lim
w!~wþ
Kðw; kcÞ ¼ lim
w!~wþ
Pdr ðAkc1Þ Pdr ðAkcÞ:
Now, observe that the retailer is indifferent between
the supply-chain optimal assortment Akc and the
smaller assortment Akc1 at w ¼ ~w (here is a sketch
of the proof of this claim: Let AðwÞ denote the
retailer’s optimal assortment at a given w. Because (i)
Pdr ðAjÞ is linear decreasing in w, and (ii) the retailer’s
profit from the optimal assortment, Pdr ðAðwÞÞ, is the
upper envelope of the functions Pdr ðAjÞ, j ¼ 1; . . . ; n, it
follows that (iii) Pdr ðAðwÞÞ is continuous in w.
Therefore, at w ¼ ~w, where the retailer’s optimal
assortment changes from Akc to Akc1, the retailer’s
profits from the two assortments are equal). Hence, as
w! ~wþ, we have Pdr ðAkc1Þ Pdr ðAkcÞ ! 0.
So far we have proved that limw!~wþKðw; kcÞ40 and
limw!~wþKðw; kcÞ ¼ 0. The result now follows.
PROOF OF (d): Let us first define some notation that will
be helpful in the proof. Let
Kjðw; kcÞ ¼
Pdr Akcð Þ Pdr ðAjÞ
j kc





Pdr ðAjÞ Pdr Akcð Þ
kc  j
so that Kðw; kcÞ ¼ maxj:kdjokc Kjðw; kcÞ
n o
. Define C(j)
for j 6¼kc such that
ðw cÞCð jÞ ¼
PdmðAjÞ Pdm Akcð Þ
j kc
: ðA6Þ
Finally, define D(j) for 1  j  n as
Dð jÞ ¼ Pdsc Akcð Þ PdscðAjÞ: ðA7Þ
It follows from the definitions above and Equations




þ ðw cÞCð jÞ for kcoj  n
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and
Kjðw; kcÞ ¼ 
Dð jÞ
kc  j
þ ðw cÞCð jÞ for kd  jokc:
We now establish some properties of C(j) that will
be useful in the proof. From the definition of Pdm Aj
 	
in (4), one can check that








; for kcoj  n:
Clearly,
Pj
i¼0 viis strictly increasing in j. Also,Pmaxfkc ;jg
i¼minfkc ;jgþ1
vi
jjkcj is decreasing in j (to see why, note thatPmaxfkc ;jg
i¼minfkc ;jgþ1
vi
jjkcj is the average value of vkcþ1 through vj or
the average value of vj11 through vkc , and vi’s are in
descending order, i.e., v1  v2      vn). Therefore,
C( j) is strictly decreasing in j.
Now we are ready to show that Kðw; kcÞ  Kðw; kcÞ is
decreasing in w for w 2 ð~w; p. Note that Kðw; kcÞ and
Kðw; kcÞ are not necessarily continuous and differenti-
able in w 2 ð~w; p. However, at w 2 ð~w; p where











ðjÞ (to see why @ Kjðw;kcÞ@w ¼ CðjÞ, note that Kjðw; kcÞ ¼
DðjÞ
jkc þ ðw cÞCðjÞ for kcoj  n, and D(j) and kc do not












Cð jÞ. Therefore, at w 2 ð~w; p, if both Kðw; kcÞ











where the first inequality follows from (A9), the last
inequality follows from (A8), and the second inequal-
ity follows from our earlier observation that C(j) is
decreasing in j.
Now, take any ða; b  ð~w; p. If both Kðw; kcÞand
Kðw; kcÞ are continuous and differentiable in (a, b],




@w by (A10). If Kðw; kcÞ is discontinuous
at b, then the jump in Kðw; kcÞ is upwards, causing
Kðw; kcÞ  Kðw; kcÞ to decrease (to see why this is true,
note that a discontinuity in Kðw; kcÞ will arise at w 5 b
only if arg maxkdjokc Kjðw; kcÞ
n o
changes at b. More-
over, kd is non-increasing in w, which implies that the
domain kd  jokc over which Kjðw; kcÞ is maximized
is not going to get smaller as w increases). Similarly, if
Kðw; kcÞ is discontinuous at b, then the jump in Kðw; kcÞ
is downwards, causing Kðw; kcÞ  Kðw; kcÞ to decrease.
The entire interval ð~w; p can be divided into a number
of such (a, b) intervals. Thus, Kðw; kcÞ  Kðw; kcÞ is
decreasing in w for w 2 ð~w; p. &
LEMMA 2. Suppose the products are indexed so that
v1  v2      vn. For an assortment S	f1, . . ., ng, define
S0(d) as the assortment S augmented with a product whose
preference is d. Let D ¼
Pn1
i¼1 ðvi  vnÞ;M ¼ lðp wÞ and







dd  0 for any S	f1, . . ., ng and d
such that vn  d.




j2S vj þ d
v0 þ
P









j2S vj þ dÞ
b :







j . Then, P
d
r ðS0ðdÞÞ can be written as
Pdr ðS0ðdÞÞ ¼ GM 1
v0
v0 þ V þ d
 
 GZ X þ d
b
ðv0 þ V þ dÞb
:










v0 þ V þ d
d
 1b




Since d  vn and v1  v2      vn, we can make
the following two observations: (i) v0þVþdd  1
þ v0þVvn ¼ nþ 1þ
v0þD
vn
, (ii) v0 þ V  Xd1b  v0 þ V
Xv1bn  v0 þ D. Applying these two observations to
(A11) yields the lemma. &
Notes
1Not all of these seven products are produced by the same
manufacturer; we assume that to be the case for our illus-
Aydın and Hausman: Role of Slotting Fees in the Coordination of Assortment Decisions
Production and Operations Management 18(6), pp. 635–652, r 2009 Production and Operations Management Society 651
trative purposes. The preference values are based on the
market shares as represented by the weekly sales quantities.
The price of the product is estimated as the average of the
seven prices, which are similar to begin with. The produc-
tion cost estimate is based on the assumption that it costs a
manufacturer $1080 to produce one metric ton of a paper
product (http://www.risiinfo.com/blogs/Blog-Tissue-pro-
duction-whos-the-best.html, last accessed on May 26,
2008). We assume each period is a week long and the lead-
time is 4 weeks. The weekly holding cost is assumed to be
about 4% of the unit production cost and the backorder cost
is chosen so that the optimal stockout probability in a week
is slightly o5%. The weekly rate for discounting cash flows
is assumed to be 0.005.
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